University of Hamburg Department of Social and Economic Sciences Political Science Dr. Verena Fetscher

24-204.13

Political Representation and Economic Inequality

Fall-Winter 2021, Tuesdays, 14:15-15:45 (online)

Office Hours: Tuesdays, 16:00-17:00 (by appointment)

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Course Outline

The seminar introduces students to empirical research on political representation and economic inequality. The theoretical idea that the interest of each person is given equal consideration in political decision-making stands at the very core of democratic governance. By now, there is strong evidence that policy-making in some democracies is biased towards the wealthy and better-off parts of society, and that unequal representation has been found for legislators, party platforms, national policy and state policy. To complicate matters even further, research also shows that the gap in political participation keeps widening.

In the course of the seminar, we will assess some of the most relevant research in the field. What do we currently know about political equality and representation? Who are the underrepresented and how do political institutions matter? How does economic inequality come in? Finally, how can we link economic inequality to current political phenomena related to identity politics and populism? Students will become familiar with the most influential theoretical and empirical work on these topics. They will assess theoretical approaches, research strategies and empirics in the literature and put a specific focus on the connection between theoretical models and empirical implications.

Requirements

Readings. Students must read the assigned literature thoroughly before class. Readings are diverse and cover a wide span of topics. Learning takes place through a critical and active engagement with the course material.

When you read the literature, answer the following questions (if applicable):

- What is the political phenomena that the author is interested in?
- What is the research question?
- What are the central concepts?
- What is the theoretical argument?
- Which hypotheses do(es) the author(s) propose?
- How are the central concepts operationalized?
- Which research design do(es) the author(s) use in order to test the hypotheses empirically?
- Do the results support the hypothesis?
- Which conclusions do the authors draw?

On OpenOlat, you find several specific readings questions for each session.

Reading Questions (OpenOlat). Respond to the reading questions. Once you believe the questions are answered sufficiently, start discussing. To do so, evaluate strengths and weaknesses of the readings. Ask yourself while reading:

- Why does one thing cause another? Are you convinced by the claim the authors make? Does it fit with what you already know about the world? E.g.
 - If individuals are the main actors in the argument, are the motivations implied by the argument plausible accounts of how individuals behave? Why/why not.
 - If individuals are not the unit of analysis in the argument being made, which individuals would have to be motivated, in what way, and to do what for the argument to hold?
- Does the evidence the authors offer support the argument?
- Are there other interpretations of the findings?
- Are the concepts properly defined?
- Are there problems with operationalization?
- Data considerations? E.g. can the argument be applied to other countries? Does the time period under investigation matter?
- Theoretical or empirical implications of the argument that have not been assessed?

Aim to add at least three comments or responses to existing comments each week. I expect you to contribute to the discussion. Repeated non-participation means that you will not pass the seminar.

Short Essays. Assess the main structure of the readings (required and recommended literature) and give answers to the questions above. Each student submits two short essays to the instructor during the course of the seminar. Each short essay should not be longer than 3-4 pages (double spaced, 12pt font, justified text, header specifying university, course, lecturer, your name and date, title) and should a) motivate the topic and introduce a research question in the introduction, b) assess the key literature and discuss similarities and differences between the readings, c) propose an argument by elaborating on weaknesses or blind spots of the paper, or by suggesting further theoretical or empirical implications of the arguments being made in the literature and d) summarize your main points and discuss possible weaknesses of your argument in the conclusion.

Short essays are structured along the following points:

- Introduction (1 point)
 - Motivate the topic
 - Identify research question (what/why)
- Assessment and contextualization of the key literature (2 points)
 - What are the most important approaches on the topic?
 - How do the (course) papers relate to each other (focus on key concepts)?
 - Do they criticize, complement, affirm each other?
- Argument (2 points)
 - Your paper makes a single argument or a number of related arguments (you can build on ideas for criticism above), e.g.:
 - * The authors argue that democracy causes economic growth
 - * The causal pathway that the authors propose is unclear
 - * The provision of property rights is essential for economic growth to take place
 - * Property rights could go hand in hand with another set of rights which eventually lead to institutions that spur the development of democratic governance
 - Be clear: Define the concepts you are working with and how they relate to each other.
 - Use empirical material (facts, numbers, history) to back your argument.
 - Go beyond a summary of the readings.
- Conclusion (1 point)
 - Summarize your main points.
 - Anticipate possible weaknesses your audience might raise.

I will evaluate your short essays with respect to four criteria listed above. I deduct 2 points from your total score if structure, form and style do not meet the criteria. The essays are to be sent to the instructor no later than Sunday, 5pm, before the respective session.

Please note that the fulfillment of the previous requirements, as well as regular attendance, is necessary in order to be accepted to take the final paper.

Final paper. The final paper follows the structure provided in the "FinalPaper layout" document. It has 12-15 pages (1,5 spaced, Times New Roman 12pt, formatted as justified text) and is due on **Friday, 25 February, 10 am**.

I will evaluate your final paper with respect to the following criteria: a) frame (introduction and conclusion), b) previous literature, c) theoretical framework, d) empirical analysis, e) structure, form and style. For each criterion you can receive 2 points.

Absences. You are expected to attend every class. Please inform me in advance if you will not be able to attend a session. The class is organized in a cumulative manner, it is necessary for you to catch up with the material in case of missing a session.

Cheating. The University's minimum penalty for plagiarism is to fail the course. Cheating or plagiarism can lead to expulsion (Exmatrikulation) from the University.

Suggestions. Suggestions for improvement are welcome at any time.

Recommended Books

- Lisa A Baglione. 2018. Writing a Research Paper in Political Science: A Practical Guide to Inquiry, Structure, and Methods. Cq Press
- Paul M. Kellstedt and Guy D. Whitten. 2018. The Fundamentals of Political Science Research. 3rd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Dimiter Toshkov. 2016. Research Design in Political Science. Macmillan International Higher Education
- Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton Paperbacks. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press

Schedule

October 12 Course Organization and Technicalities October 19 Unequal Democracy October 26 Unequal Policy Responsiveness November 2 Unequal Participation November 9 Immigrant Representation November 16 Female Representation November 23 Organized Interests November 30 Preferences Perception and Information December 7 December 14 Fairness and Beliefs December 21 Christmas Break December 28 Christmas Break January 4 Attitudes towards Immigration January 11 Populism January 18 Research Workshop January 25 Final Session

1. Course Organization and Technicalities

2. Unequal Democracy

Required:

- Larry M. Bartels. 2016. *Unequal Democracy*. 2nd ed. Princeton University Press, Ch. 1,3
- Martin Gilens. 2005. "Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 69 (5): 778–796

Recommended:

- Elizabeth Rigby and Gerald C. Wright. 2013. "Political Parties and Representation of the Poor in the American States." *American Journal of Political Science* 57 (3): 552–565
- Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson. 2010. "Winner-Take-All Politics: Public Policy, Political Organization, and the Precipitous Rise of Top Incomes in the United States." *Politics & Society* 38 (2): 152–204
- Martin Gilens. 2012. Affluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in America. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press and New York: Russell Sage Foundation

3. Unequal Policy Responsiveness

Required:

- Mads Andreas Elkjaer and Torben Iversen. 2020. "The Political Representation of Economic Interests: Subversion of Democracy or Middle-Class Supremacy?" World Politics 72 (2): 254–290
- Patrick Flavin and William W Franko. 2020. "Economic Segregation and Unequal Policy Responsiveness." *Political Behavior* 42 (3): 845–864

Recommended:

- Mads Andreas Elkjær. 2020. "What Drives Unequal Policy Responsiveness?
 Assessing the Role of Informational Asymmetries in Economic Policy-Making."
 Comparative Political Studies, 2213–2245
- Lea Elsässer, Svenja Hense, and Armin Schäfer. 2020. "Not Just Money: Unequal Responsiveness in Egalitarian Democracies." *Journal of European Public Policy*, 1–19
- Wouter Schakel. 2021. "Unequal Policy Responsiveness in the Netherlands." Socio-Economic Review 19 (1): 37–57

4. Unequal Participation

Required:

- Kay Lehman Schlozman, Henry E Brady, and Sidney Verba. 2018. *Unequal and Unrepresented: Political Inequality and the People's Voice in the New Gilded Age*. Princeton University Press Ch.2-4
- Frederick Solt. 2008. "Economic Inequality and Democratic Political Engagement." American Journal of Political Science 52 (1): 48–60

Recommended:

- Matthew Polacko. 2021. "Inequality, Policy Polarization and the Income Gap in Turnout." *Party Politics*, 13540688211011924
- Robert S. Erikson. 2015. "Income Inequality and Policy Responsiveness." *Annual Review of Political Science* 18 (1): 11–29
- Cindy D Kam and Carl L Palmer. 2008. "Reconsidering the Effects of Education on Political Participation." *The Journal of Politics* 70 (3): 612–631

5. Immigrant Representation

Required:

- Bernt Bratsberg et al. 2020. "How Settlement Locations and Local Networks Influence Immigrant Political Integration." *American Journal of Political Science* 00 (0)
- Rafaela M. Dancygier et al. 2015. "Why Are Immigrants Underrepresented in Politics? Evidence from Sweden." American Political Science Review 109 (04): 703–724

Recommended:

- Rafaela M. Dancygier. 2017. Dilemmas of Inclusion: Muslims in European Politics. Princeton, United States: Princeton University Press Ch. 2, 3
- Jane Mansbridge. 1999. "Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent" Yes"." The Journal of Politics 61 (3): 628–657

6. Female Representation

Required:

- Amanda Clayton and Pär Zetterberg. 2018. "Quota Shocks: Electoral Gender Quotas and Government Spending Priorities Worldwide." The Journal of Politics 80 (3): 916–932
- Raghabendra Chattopadhyay and Esther Duflo. 2004. "Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India." *Econometrica* 72 (5): 1409–1443

Recommended:

- Melanie M Hughes. 2011. "Intersectionality, Quotas, and Minority Women's Political Representation Worldwide." *American Political Science Review* 105 (3): 604–620
- Rikhil R. Bhavnani. 2009. "Do Electoral Quotas Work after They Are Withdrawn? Evidence from a Natural Experiment in India." *The American Political Science Review* 103 (1): 23–35

7. Organized Interests

Required:

- John S. Ahlquist. 2017. "Labor Unions, Political Representation, and Economic Inequality." *Annual Review of Political Science* 20 (1): 409–432
- Sung Eun Kim and Yotam Margalit. 2017. "Informed Preferences? The Impact of Unions on Workers' Policy Views." *American Journal of Political Science* 61 (3): 728–743

Recommended:

- Francesc Amat et al. 2020. "From Political Mobilization to Electoral Participation: Turnout in Barcelona in the 1930s." The Journal of Politics 82 (4): 1559–1575
- Michael Becher, Daniel Stegmueller, and Konstantin Käppner. 2018. "Local Union Organization and Law Making in the US Congress." *The Journal of Politics* 80 (2): 539–554

8. Preferences

Required:

- Torben Iversen and David Soskice. 2001. "An Asset Theory of Social Policy Preferences." *American Political Science Review* 95 (4): 875–893
- Allan H. Meltzer and Scott F. Richard. 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government." *Journal of Political Economy* 89 (5): 914

Recommended:

- David Rueda and Daniel Stegmueller. 2019. Who Wants What?: Redistribution Preferences in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Ch.2, 3
- Matthew Dimick, Daniel Stegmueller, and David Rueda. 2016. "The Altruistic Rich? Inequality and Other-Regarding Preferences for Redistribution." Quarterly Journal of Political Science 11 (4): 385–439
- Karl O. Moene and Michael Wallerstein. 2001. "Inequality, Social Insurance, and Redistribution." American Political Science Review 95 (4): 859–874
- Hal R. Varian. 1980. "Redistributive Taxation as Social Insurance." *Journal of Public Economics* 14 (1): 49–68

9. Perception and Information

Required:

- Vladimir Gimpelson and Daniel Treisman. 2018. "Misperceiving Inequality." Economics & Politics 30 (1): 27–54
- Rohini Pande. 2011. "Can Informed Voters Enforce Better Governance? Experiments in Low-Income Democracies." *Annual Review of Economics* 3 (1): 215–237

Recommended:

- Carina Engelhardt and Andreas Wagener. 2018. "What Do Germans Think and Know about Income Inequality? A Survey Experiment." *Socio-Economic Review* 16, no. 4 (October 1, 2018): 743–767
- Ilyana Kuziemko et al. 2015. "How Elastic Are Preferences for Redistribution? Evidence from Randomized Survey Experiments." *American Economic Review* 105 (4): 1478–1508

10. Fairness and Beliefs

Required:

- Jonathan JB Mijs. 2019. "The Paradox of Inequality: Income Inequality and Belief in Meritocracy Go Hand in Hand." Socio-Economic Review 0 (0): 1–29
- Ingvild Almås, Alexander W. Cappelen, and Bertil Tungodden. 2019. "Cutthroat Capitalism versus Cuddly Socialism: Are Americans More Meritocratic and Efficiency-Seeking than Scandinavians?" *Journal of Political Economy*

Recommended:

- Kris-Stella Trump. 2018. "Income Inequality Influences Perceptions of Legitimate Income Differences." *British Journal of Political Science* 48 (4): 929–952
- Adrian Bruhin, Ernst Fehr, and Daniel Schunk. 2019. "The Many Faces of Human Sociality: Uncovering the Distribution and Stability of Social Preferences." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 17 (4): 1025–1069
- Alberto Alesina, Stefanie Stantcheva, and Edoardo Teso. 2018. "Intergenerational Mobility and Preferences for Redistribution." *American Economic Review* 108 (2): 521–54

11. Attitudes towards Immigration

Required:

- Sergi Pardos-Prado and Carla Xena. 2019. "Skill Specificity and Attitudes toward Immigration." American Journal of Political Science 63 (2): 286–304
- Dominik Hangartner et al. 2019. "Does Exposure to the Refugee Crisis Make Natives More Hostile?" American Political Science Review 113 (2): 442–455

Recommended:

- Henning Finseraas and Andreas Kotsadam. 2017. "Does Personal Contact with Ethnic Minorities Affect Anti-immigrant Sentiments? Evidence from a Field Experiment." European Journal of Political Research 56 (3): 703–722
- Rafaela M. Dancygier. 2010. *Immigration and Conflict in Europe*. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Ch. 2 and Ch. 9
- Alberto Alesina, Armando Miano, and Stefanie Stantcheva. 2018. *Immigration and Redistribution*. 0898-2937. National Bureau of Economic Research

12. Populism

Required:

- Helen V Milner. 2021. "Voting for Populism in Europe: Globalization, Technological Change, and the Extreme Right." *Comparative Political Studies*, 0010414021997175
- Noam Gidron and Peter A. Hall. 2019. "Populism as a Problem of Social Integration." Comparative Political Studies 53 (7): 1027–1059

Recommended:

- Pippa Norris. 2020. "Measuring Populism Worldwide." *Party Politics* 26 (6): 697–717
- Ernesto Dal Bó et al. 2018. "Economic Losers and Political Winners: Sweden's Radical Right." Working Paper
- Yann Algan et al. 2017. "The European Trust Crisis and the Rise of Populism." Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2017 (2): 309–400
- Luigi Guiso et al. 2017. "Populism: Demand and Supply." Working Paper
- Yotam Margalit. 2019. "Political Responses to Economic Shocks." *Annual Review of Political Science* 22:277–295
- Ronald F Inglehart and Pippa Norris. 2016. "Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash." Working Paper
- Sarah Engler and David Weisstanner. 2021. "The Threat of Social Decline: Income Inequality and Radical Right Support." *Journal of European Public Policy* 28 (2): 153–173

13. Research Workshop

14. Final Session